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2A-12/22/94 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14816 
COUNTY OF YATES, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
DAVID LEE FOSTER, COUNTY ATTORNEY, for Respondent 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG, GROSS, RICHMOND, HEIDELBERGER, 
REICH & SCRICCA (NEIL M. BLOCK of counsel), AMICUS CURIAE 
for Board of Cooperative Educational Services of Nassau 
County 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). 
CSEA's charge against the County of Yates (County) alleges that 
the County violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it refused CSEA's demand for the social 
security numbers of those County employees in CSEA's unit who are 
required to pay an agency shop fee pursuant to §208.3(b) of the 
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Act--7 The ALJ held that the County had not violated the Act by 
refusing CSEA the nonmembers' social security numbers because 
CSEA had not established a need for that information.^7 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that its need was reasonably 
established. The County has not responded to the exceptions. 
The Board of Cooperative Educational Services of Nassau County 
(Nassau BOCES), which has a similar charge (U-14546) filed 
against it by CSEA pending before another ALJ, was granted amicus 
status. With the consent of the parties, the Nassau BOCES was 
also permitted to participate at oral argument because the County 
elected not to attend and we considered that our analysis would 
benefit by advocacy on both sides of the issues presented. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the issues as argued, 
we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ's dismissal of the charge was premised only upon her 
determination that CSEA had not shown it had a need for the 
nonmembers' social security numbers. We find there to be a 
reasonable need for the information, however, based upon the 
County's admission in that respect. CSEA detailed its need for 
the nonmembers' social security numbers in a letter to the County 
-
7The agency shop fee provisions of the Act require the 
nonmembers of a certified or recognized exclusive bargaining 
agent to pay a dues equivalent fee to the union subject to a pro 
rata return upon the nonmember's objection to the union's 
expenditures for political or ideological purposes. 
-
7See, e.cr. , City Sch. Dist. of the City of Albany, 6 PERB [^3012 
(1973), for the factors considered in assessing whether there is 
a duty to provide information to a bargaining agent on demand. 
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Attorney. After a review of those reasons and an internal 
discussion, the County Attorney informed CSEA that the County 
would provide CSEA with the social security numbers of the 
nonmembers on condition that the numbers not be disclosed to 
anyone "outside of the Collective Bargaining Group". This letter 
clearly represents the County's acknowledgement that CSEA had 
reasonably established a sufficient need for the information, and 
the County has never alleged or argued to the contrary. It was 
only the County's concern for the nonmembers' privacy which 
ultimately prompted the County to withhold the information it had 
earlier promised to release. We turn, therefore, to a 
consideration of those privacy arguments. 
From our review of federal and state law, we conclude, as 
have the parties, that the County is not prohibited from 
releasing to CSEA the information it requested. Federal-7 and 
New York State-7 personal privacy protection statutes are 
inapplicable in relevant part to local governments. 
It has been held, however, that a government is not required 
to release the social security numbers of its employees under 
^Compare the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (1988 ed. and 
Supp. IV) as construed in United States Dep't of Defense v. FLRA, 
114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994). In that case, the Supreme Court held 
that the home addresses of bargaining unit employees could not be 
disclosed to the union representative of those employees because 
the Privacy Act, applicable to federal agencies, prohibited the 
disclosure of any records unless the disclosure was required 
under the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) . The Court 
concluded that disclosure was not required under the FOIA and 
was, therefore, prohibited by the Privacy Act. 
^Public Officers Law §92(1). 
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New York's Freedom of Information Law-7 (FOIL) because the 
release constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy within the 
meaning of an exemption in Public Officers Law §87(2)(b) to the 
general disclosure requirement.-7 The FOIL decisions are not 
dispositive of the issue in this case, however, because the 
County, although not required to disclose the social security 
numbers of its employees under FOIL, retains the discretion to do 
so. As the Court of Appeals stated in Capital Newspapers v. 
Burns:-7 
[w]hile an agency is permitted to restrict 
access to those records falling within the 
statutory exemptions, the language of the 
exemption provision contains permissive 
rather than mandatory language, and it is 
within the agency's discretion to disclose 
such records . . . ,-7 
It is, of course, the very fact that a public employer has 
discretion to act in one way or another which subjects it to a 
bargaining obligation. The exercise of that power and privilege 
to release, which is afforded the County under FOIL, is subject 
to controlling provisions of other State law, including the Act. 
Ultimately, therefore, the question becomes whether the policies 
of the Act are advanced by requiring an employer to disclose to a 
bargaining agent the social security numbers of the nonmembers in 
^Public Officers Law Art. 6, §§84-90. 
^
7Selliq v. Sielaff. 201 A.D.2d 298 (1st Dep't 1994). 
Z767 N.Y.2d 562 (1986) . 
^
7Id. at 567. 
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its unit despite the well recognized and significant privacy 
interests individuals have in their social security numbers. 
Having considered these several policy issues, we conclude 
that the County's conditional release to CSEA of the nonmembers' 
social security numbers is required under §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
The information CSEA requested is reasonably relevant and 
concededly necessary to its fulfillment of the obligations 
imposed upon it by the agency shop fee provisions of the Act as 
interpreted.-x That information is also not reasonably available 
to CSEA except through the County and the County does not argue 
that the production of that information is burdensome. Were it 
not for the privacy interests of the individuals there would be 
no question of CSEA's entitlement to that information on the 
facts of this case, nor would the County otherwise question that 
entitlement. Those privacy interests, however significant, do 
not prohibit disclosure in relevant context. The public may not 
be entitled to access the employees' social security numbers 
under FOIL, but that does not mean that a union certified or 
recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees of 
a public employer may be denied that same information on a demand 
made pursuant to the Act. A bargaining agent is simply not 
similarly situated to the general public when it demands 
-'These allegations include a duty to provide information to 
nonmembers regarding the agency shop fee refund procedures, to 
account to them regarding expenditures and to return on demand 
the nonmembers' pro rata share of expenditures for political or 
ideological purposes. 
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employment information from an employer about employees it is 
obligated to represent. New York's FOIL is concerned basically 
with the public's right to know about the operations of 
government as government. A public employee's social security 
number is largely irrelevant to the performance of the employee's 
duties. It is for that reason that disclosure of such 
information is deemed an unwarranted invasion of privacy and 
exempt as such from compulsory disclosure under FOIL. A 
bargaining agent demanding employment information of a 
government, however, is not seeking information about government 
as government, but government as employer. It is entitled to 
demand and receive relevant information from an employer under 
the Act because the information is needed to enable it to 
exercise its rights and carry out the responsibilities imposed 
upon it under the Act. 
We are, however, sensitive to the harm which can be caused 
to individuals by the unscrupulous use of their social security 
numbers. By shaping the conditions for the release and the use 
of the nonmembers' social security numbers, however, we can 
protect individual privacy interests without sacrificing CSEA's 
right to information under the Act. Our decision, therefore, 
recognizes the legitimate interests on both sides and strikes 
what we believe is an appropriate balance between them. CSEA's 
articulated need for the social security numbers simultaneously 
limits the permissible uses of those numbers. The nonmembers' 
social security numbers are made available for CSEA's 
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confidential, exclusive use in conjunction with its rights and 
duties under the Act vis-a-vis the unit of County employees it 
represents. The nonconsensual use of those numbers by other than 
agents of CSEA or the use or release of any such number by any 
means under any condition for other than statutory purposes is 
not authorized by our decision. It is clear from the record that 
CSEA understands the need to maintain the strict confidentiality 
of all social security numbers delivered to it and is amenable to 
conditions intended to effect that result. Should there be proof 
of noncompliance with these conditions for release, we will 
entertain a motion to reopen and modify our decision and order 
herein as may be appropriate. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County forthwith provide 
CSEA with the social security numbers of unit employees who pay 
an agency shop fee pursuant to §208.3(b) of the Act and to sign 
and post notice in the form attached at all locations ordinarily 
used to post notices of information to unit employees. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^&S.^ S.tuv<% 
Paul ine R. K i n s e l l a , Chai rperson 
Walter--fj. E i s enbe rg , Member 
Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEWYORKSTATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) that the County of Yates will forthwith provide CSEA with the social security numbers of unit 
employees who pay an agency shop fee pursuant to §208.3(b) of the Act. 
Dated By . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF YATES 
this Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be aitered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNIONDALE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
APT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14559 
UNIONDALE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOSEPH P. McPARTLIN, for Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (JOHN T. BAUER Of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions to 
an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision filed, respectively, 
by the Uniondale Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association) and the Uniondale Union Free School District 
(District). The Association charged the District with a 
violation of §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused to deduct an agency 
shop fee from one athletic coach, Philip Corbo, and refused to 
process a union membership dues deduction authorization from two 
other athletic coaches, Leigh Pollet and Annette Barnes. On a 
stipulated record, the ALJ dismissed the charge on a finding that 
these three coaches are not in the Association's unit and, 
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therefore, the District had no statutory duty to deduct either 
agency shop fees or membership dues. 
The parties' exceptions are directed only to the AKJ's 
conclusion regarding the coaches' inclusion in the Association's 
unit. The Association argues that the evidence establishes that 
all persons who coach athletics are in its unit. The District 
argues that the evidence establishes that the Association 
represents only those coaches who are otherwise in its unit by 
virtue of their employment with the District. Specifically, the 
District argues that the Association does not represent Corbo as 
coach because he is a department chairman who is in a unit 
represented by the Uniondale Supervisors Association (USA), which 
bargains for department chairs' extracurricular activities, 
including coaching. Pollet and Barnes are not represented by the 
Association according to the District because they are "outside" 
personnel who hold no other employment with the District. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the charge on the 
finding that the three coaches are not in the Association's unit. 
Preliminarily, we consider an argument by the District that 
the Association's exceptions and supporting brief were not filed 
as separate documents as required by §2 04.10(a) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). The Association claims in its response to the 
District's cross-exceptions that it filed its exceptions as a 
separate document under a letter dated July 15, 1994. Our files, 
however, do not contain such a letter, but we conclude that the 
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Association's exceptions and brief were filed in substantial 
compliance with §204.10(a) of the Rules. The Association's 
exceptions are separated from the arguments supporting them. 
Therefore, we and the District are reasonably able to distinguish 
between those exceptions and the argument, thereby materially 
achieving the result §204.10(a) of the Rules is intended to 
effect. 
On the merits, the Association represents, through its 
contractual recognition clause, "all certified teachers", 
excluding department chairpersons, administrators and persons in 
the supervisory negotiating unit. Corbo, as previously stated, 
is a department chairman, who is included in USA's unit and 
excluded from the Association's unit. Article IX of USA's 
contract with the District permits unit employees to engage in 
extracurricular activities, such as coaching, and to receive 
additional compensation for such services. The extracurricular 
activities of personnel in USA's unit are authorized and paid 
pursuant to USA's contract. That the USA's contract has not 
fixed a specific rate of compensation for the extracurricular 
activities pursued by its unit members is immaterial. That 
contract, at the very least, currently permits the payment of 
compensation to them at a rate determined by the District. In 
any event, USA and the District at any time could make specific 
and fixed that which is currently open-ended. As such, the 
extracurricular activities of the department chairpersons have 
been and can be the subject of negotiations between the District 
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and the USA and the most reasonable conclusion is that Corbo, a 
department chairman, is in USA's unit for all relevant purposes. 
Pollet and Barnes have no relevant relationship to the 
District except as coaches. It does not appear to us that any of 
the District's unions represent the position of coach. Quite the 
contrary, coaching appears to be merely a voluntary assignment, 
which the District offers to its unit personnel and to 
"outsiders" when there are not enough volunteers from among the 
District's employees. The Association, of course, does not 
represent assignments, but positions and their incumbents. 
Therefore, although the Association has negotiated coaching 
rates, those negotiations are merely an incident of its 
representation of teachers and the others in its recognized unit 
who might elect to coach or accept some other extracurricular 
assignment. 
Our conclusion is supported, as the ALJ observed, by the 
fact that the Association did not claim representation over 
outside coaches hired regularly by the District prior to the 
1992-93 school year, nor did the Association ever solicit these 
individuals for membership in the Association. We are, 
therefore, persuaded that the Association itself did not consider 
coaches drawn from outside the teaching staff to be included in 
its unit. 
Our decision recognizes that Pollet and Barnes are without 
current representation under the Act. However, many persons 
eligible for representation under the Act have not exercised that 
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right. Without deciding whether Pollett or Barnes is eligible 
for representation, the Association, or another union, is free to 
seek their representation in the appropriate unit either by 
agreement with the District or pursuant to the appropriate 
representation petition filed under the Act and our Rules. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the Association's exceptions are dismissed. Having 
affirmed the ALJ's decision, we need not and do not reach any of 
the District's other cross-exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
%±~^ ic L<tl 
Pauline R. Kinsella , Ch 




E r i c J .~33chmertz , Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4235 
COUNTY OF ALBANY, 
Employer. 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C., for Petitioner 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C, for Employer 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated April 11, 1994, the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) found that 
United Public Services Employees Union, Local 424 (Local 424), A 
Division of United Industry Workers District Council 424, was 
eligible for certification without an election in a unit of 
employees of the County of Albany (County). We first considered 
Local 424's eligibility for certification in this case at our 
May 31, 1994 meeting. At that meeting, we determined not to 
issue a certification pursuant to the Director's recommendation 
because issues had been raised in other pending cases involving 
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Local 42 4 regarding its status as an employee organization under 
§201.5 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).-7 
The parties in this case were informed of our determination not 
to issue a certification to Local 424 at that time by letter 
dated June 7, 1994. By decision dated September 30, 1994,-' we 
held that Local 424 as then constituted was not an employee 
organization within the meaning of the Act. Local 424's appeal 
of our determination in that respect is now pending in Supreme 
Court, Kings County. 
By letter dated December 9, 1994, Local 424 demands, 
alternatively, that we certify it as the bargaining agent in this 
case or that all members of the Board recuse themselves such that 
the decision of the Director "stands". Local 424 argues lastly 
that any questions concerning its status as an employee 
organization have been "mooted" by changes in its structure, 
which were made after, and in response to, our September 30, 1994 
decision. 
For the reasons set forth below, we do not issue a 
certification to Local 424 in this case but remand it to the 
Director for such investigation and processing as may be 
appropriate. 
^Northport/East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist. , 27 PERB [^3025 
(1994) . 
^27 PERB J[3053 (1994) . 
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Local 424's request to have the participating members of 
this Board recuse themselves is denied as the asserted grounds 
for the recusal are either without factual basis or otherwise 
without merit or frivolous. Member Schmertz, however, has 
voluntarily elected not to participate in the discussion or 
decision of any of the cases involving Local 424's status as an 
employee organization and he has again not participated and has 
absented himself from the discussion and decision of the instant 
case. We would note, moreover, that our recusal would not effect 
Local 424's certification. The Director's decision was a 
recommendation only. Only the Board may certify an employee 
organization as a bargaining agent for purposes of the Act. 
Therefore, even were the Director's decision to "stand" by reason 
of any recusal, it would not afford Local 424 any statutory 
bargaining rights and would not impose upon the County any 
statutory bargaining obligations. 
The effect of Local 424's alleged changes in its structure 
on its status as an employee organization has not been previously 
evaluated. That same issue is now pending before the Director, 
either directly or indirectly, in other cases. In keeping with 
our established policy and procedures, changes in Local 424's 
structure are not properly considered by us without prior 
investigation and determination by the Director. 
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The case is, accordingly, remanded to the Director for 
investigation and determination in accordance with this decision. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Mk A. Pauxine R. Kinsella,Chairperson 
A/i*^~ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKY POINT SCHOOL RELATED PERSONNEL 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14747 
ROCKY POINT UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
MARTIN FEINBERG, for Charging Party 
IN6ERMAN, SMITH, 6REENBUR6, GROSS, RICHMOND, HEIDELBERGER, 
REICH & SCRICCA (JOHN H. GROSS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Rocky 
Point School Related Personnel Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its charge that the Rocky Point Union Free School 
District (District) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally increasing to twelve 
months the workyear of three, ten-month clerk typists represented 
by the Association. The ALJ determined that, pursuant to language 
in the parties' current collective bargaining agreement, PERB 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the charge and, 
alternatively, that the Association had waived its right to 
negotiate the change. 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that 
the collective bargaining agreement does not divest PERB of 
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jurisdiction and that the language relied on by the ALT does not 
constitute a clear, explicit and knowing waiver of its right to 
negotiate. The District supports the ALT's decision. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALT. 
The parties stipulated to the following facts. Prior to July 
1, 1993, three clerk typists - Loretta Reiter, Patricia O'Neill and 
Ann Reynen - were employed by the District as ten-month employees, 
working from September 1 to June 3 0 each year, as provided in 
Article VIII (A) of the contract.17 Effective July 1, 1993, the 
District unilaterally changed their workyear to twelve months. The 
employees' salaries and fringe benefits were increased on a pro-
rata basis to reflect their increased workyear. 
The contract defines the length of the workyear for ten-month 
employees, setting forth the starting month and the ending month. 
The Association's charge alleges a unilateral change in the 
workyear of the ten-month employees. As we have previously held, 
"we are without jurisdiction under §205.5 (d) of the Act when the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement provides the charging 
party with a reasonably arguable source of right with respect to 
the subject matter of the charge."-7 Article VIII(A) of the 
-
L/The Article, entitled "workyear", provides that "10 month 
employees (sic) work year shall begin on September 1 and end on 
June 3 0th." 
g/Countv of Nassau, 25 PERB J[3071, at 3147 (1992) . 
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parties' contract is an arguable source of right to the Association 
with respect to the length of the unit employees' workyear and the 
specific months to be worked. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's exceptions 
are denied and the ALJ's decision dismissing the charge for lack of 
jurisdiction is affirmed.^7 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
s*. Pauline R. itinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member [ 
Eric/ff. Schmertz, Member 
-'As an alternative disposition, the ALJ found that the Association 
had waived its right to negotiate the at-issue change in workyear 
because of Article XVII in the parties' current contract, which 
provides that: 
All terms and conditions of employment not covered 
by this Agreement shall continue to be subject to the 
Board's direction and control and shall not be the 
subject of negotiations until the commencement of the 
negotiations for a successor to this agreement. 
In view of our disposition of the charge, we do not reach this 
aspect of the ALJ's decision or the exceptions which were filed 
with respect to it. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POUGHKEEPSIE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14797 
POUGHKEEPSIE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
SHAW AND SILVEIRA (JAY M. SIEGEL of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
C. FREDERICK OTT, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Poughkeepsie City School District (District) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge alleging 
that the Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers Association 
(Association) had violated its duty to negotiate under 
§209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
failing to submit its brief^ to the fact finder until four 
months after the original date set by the fact finder for the 
filing of briefs. 
^No hearing was held before the fact finder and the parties' 
entire fact-finding presentation consisted of the submission of 
briefs pursuant to stipulation. 
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The parties submitted the case to the ALJ on a stipulated 
record. The ALJ found that there was no violation because the 
Association's action did not have the effect of frustrating the 
negotiating process. The District argues in its exceptions that 
the ALJ erred in failing to find the Association responsible for 
a delay in negotiations, in failing to find that no legitimate 
reason was given for the delay in filing the brief with the fact 
finder, and in finding that the Association had not refused any 
District demand to return to the bargaining table-7. 
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the ALJ's 
decision. 
In August 1992, the District and the Association commenced 
negotiations for a successor to their collective bargaining 
agreement, which had expired on June 30, 1992. In September 
1992, the parties declared impasse. In October 1992, PERB 
appointed a mediator, who was thereafter appointed as fact finder 
in January 1993. On February 10, 1993, the parties met with the 
fact finder and agreed to submit their respective cases to the 
fact finder by filing fact-finding briefs by March 12, 1993. 
David Shaw, the District's negotiator, contacted C. Frederick 
Ott, the Association's representative, on March 12 and was 
advised that Ott was not yet prepared to submit his brief. Shaw 
-
7The ALJ made note that there was no separate allegation that 
the Association had refused any District demands to return to the 
bargaining table during the fact-finding process in his 
determination that the only Association conduct complained of was 
the failure to timely submit a fact-finding brief. Based upon 
our ultimate conclusion, we need not address this exception. 
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contacted Ott again on March 17 and March 24, 1993, to inquire 
about the status of the brief. On March 29, 1993, Shaw sent a 
letter to the fact finder, outlining what had happened and 
requesting that the fact finder set a new date for briefs. He 
also enclosed the District's brief, with a copy that he requested 
the fact finder forward to Ott when he had received the 
Association's brief. Shaw again wrote to the fact finder on 
April 15, 1993, complaining about the absence of a brief from the 
Association and including additional information on the 
District's financial situation. On April 20, 1993, Shaw, in 
another letter to Ott, articulated the District's concerns about 
the health insurance situation for its employees. Again on May 
10, 1993, Shaw wrote to the fact finder, since the Association 
had not yet filed its brief or indicated when it would be filing, 
requesting the establishment of a deadline for the submission of 
fact-finding briefs. Finally, on May 20, 1993, during a 
conference call with Shaw and Ott, the fact finder set June 18, 
1993 as the due date for the Association's brief. Ott did not 
file the Association's brief by the second deadline and he was 
out of his office due to illness from June 18 to July 7, 1993. 
Without having requested or received an extension of time to file 
from either Shaw or the fact finder, Ott submitted the 
Association's fact-finding brief on July 23, 1993. The parties 
received the fact finder's report and recommendations on 
August 28, 1993. 
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We have frequently held that a party's action or inaction 
which causes an unreasonable delay in the negotiations process is 
a violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith.-7 The 
obligation to negotiate in good faith extends to the mediation 
and fact-finding processes.-7 A party may not refuse to 
participate in either of the processes. Here, the Association's 
representative failed to submit its fact-finding brief either on 
the initial date set by the fact finder for submission or on the 
subsequent date set, without the consent of the fact finder or 
the District. The submission of the brief was essential to the 
fact-finding process and, indeed, constituted the Association's 
entire participation in the fact-finding proceedings. This 
substantial and unexcused detainment unreasonably delayed the 
issuance of the fact finder's report and completion of the fact-
finding process. Such conduct violates the Association's duty to 
negotiate in good faith just as any other unreasonable delay in 
the initiation or completion of the other aspects of negotiations 
would. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed and IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Association 
negotiate in good faith and post the attached notice in all 
-
7CSEA, Inc. Town of Riverhead Unit of Local 852, 2 5 PERB ?[3 057 
(1992); City of Dunkirk, 25 PERB f3029 (1992). 
*
7Citv of Mount Vernon, 11 PERB [^3 095 (1978) . 
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locations normally used by the Association to communicate with 
unit employees. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^ J . V _ ^ Tt.kxr<£0J k£^. 
P a u l i n e R. K i n s e l l a , C h a i r p e r s o n 
/u*4z_X. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEWYORKSTATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees represented by the Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers Association (Association) that the 




POUGHKEEPSIE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
2F-12/22/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STEPHEN A. PENNA, et al. , 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15729 
COUNTY OP ERIE AND ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF 
and TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, 
Respondents. 
E. CAREY CANTWELL, ESQ., for Charging Parties 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Stephen E. 
Penna and twenty-six other individuals (charging parties) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing their charge that the County 
of Erie and Erie County Sheriff (together, employer) violated 
§209-a.1(e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
and that the Teamsters Local 264 (union) breached its duty of 
fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act. The 
charging parties, all former deputy sheriffs, allege in their 
charge that the employer and the union improperly entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement which provided for retroactive 
pay increases for 1992 and 1993 "but only to [employees] 
currently on the [employer's] payroll." 
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The Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) thereafter informed the 
charging parties that their charge was deficient. The Assistant 
Director informed the charging parties that as against the 
employer, they, as individuals, have no standing to allege a 
violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act and that as to the union, no 
facts were alleged which would establish that the union's conduct 
was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. He further 
informed them that a contract which was made applicable only to 
current employees does not, absent the aforementioned conduct, 
violate the Act. The charging parties declined to withdraw the 
charge, instead filing an amendment claiming that their right to 
a salary increase was a vested right based upon an opinion by the 
New York State Comptroller. The Director thereafter dismissed 
the charge. The charging parties except to the Director's 
decision on the ground that he did not decide that their right to 
the retroactive pay increase was a vested right. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of 
the Director. 
The charging parties allege that the union and the employer 
finalized a collective bargaining agreement for the term 1992-95 
on February 17, 1994. That agreement provides for retroactive 
salary increases for 1992 and 1993, but only for employees who 
were employed by the employer at the time the collective 
bargaining agreement was finalized. The charging parties all 
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left the employer's employ before the union and the employer 
entered into the contract. 
As against the employer, the Director dismissed the charge 
because individual employees have no standing to allege a 
violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act. We affirm this 
determination. -' 
As against the union, the Director noted that this Board and 
the courts have long held that, absent improper intent, a union 
does not breach the duty of fair representation by entering into 
an agreement which favors some employees over others.-' The 
charging parties argue, however, that their right to a salary 
increase was a vested right and that the union breached its duty 
of fair representation when it acted to deprive them of this 
vested interest. They rely on an opinion of the State 
Comptroller which states that 
where an individual leaves municipal service after the 
announcement of a salary increase but before the actual 
determination of the amount of such increase, he has a 
right to any retroactive increase established after his 
separation from service, but payable for work performed 
in any period covered by the increase, during which he 
was in municipal service.-f 
-'Ballston Spa Educ. Ass'n and Ballston Spa Cent. Sch. Dist., 25 
PERB 53084 (1992); City Sch. Dist of the Citv of New York, 22 
PERB 13012 (1989) . 
-''See Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist. , 7 PERB f3058 
(1974); Litman v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 170 
A.D.2d 194, 25 PERB ^7504 (2d Dep't 1991); Gambardella v. County 
of Nassau, 168 A.D.2d 421, 24 PERB J[7553 (2d Dep't 1991). 
-'Opinion 68-898, January 3, 1969. 
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That opinion appears to involve an announced wage increase 
unilaterally adopted by the employer for unrepresented employees, 
not a negotiated collective bargaining agreement. It is, 
therefore, inapplicable to the case before us. Furthermore, here 
there was no announcement of salary increase to be effective at a 
specific time. The union and the employer negotiated through 
1992 and 1993. While the charging parties allege that "all 
parties to the bargaining acknowledged that there would be a pay 
increase", there was no announcement of a salary increase until 
the contract had been finalized. When it was finalized, the 
charging parties had already left the employer's service. 
Therefore, even if we were to give weight to the Comptroller's 
opinion, which is not binding on us, it is inapplicable to the 
facts in this case. 
A union's compromise of employees' potential contractual 
benefits does not violate its duty of fair representation.-7 
While the charging parties were excluded from the 1992 and 1993 
salary increases because they left the employer's employ before 
the announcement and implementation of the increases, the union's 
agreement to the exclusion does not violate the Act. The 
Director's decision is, therefore, affirmed and the charging 
parties' exceptions are dismissed. 
-'See Airline Pilots Ass'n., Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 24 
PERB 5 7512 (1991); Jackson v. Transworld Airlines, 457 F. 2d 
802, 80 LRRM 2362 (2d Cir. 1972); Ekas v. Carlina Nat'l 
Breweries, Inc., 101 LRRM 3101 (4th Cir. 1979). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^ 1 - ^ ' fc.kxrNJl u 
Pauline R. Kmse l l a , Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member f 
Eric J . /^chmertz, Member; 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BRIDGE AND TUNNEL OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-1422 0 
& U-14781 
TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL 
AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL 
AUTHORITY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14324 
BRIDGE AND TUNNEL OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
HAYT, HAYT & LANDAU (LAWRENCE J. WEINGARD of counsel), for 
Charging Party in case Nos. U-14220 & U-14781 and Respondent 
in Case No. U-14324 
PROSKAUER, ROSE, GOETZ & MENDELSOHN (NEIL H. ABRAMSON of 
counsel), for Respondent in Case Nos. U-14220 & U-14781 and 
Charging Party in Case No. U-14324 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Bridge and 
Tunnel Officers Benevolent Association (Association) to an 
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Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision-!7. The Triborough 
Bridge and Tunnel Authority (Authority) has filed a response to 
the exceptions. 
The Association filed its first charge (U-14220) alleging 
that the Authority had violated of §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting either 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiations, new or previously settled 
demands to compulsory interest arbitration. The Authority 
thereafter filed a charge (U-14324) alleging that the Association 
had violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by submitting nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation to arbitration. The parties then engaged 
in discussions which resulted in the withdrawal or modification 
of several proposals. The Association filed its second charge 
(U-14781) in response to the July 1, 1993 final modification of 
proposals submitted by the Authority, alleging that the 
modifications were untimely and had changed or escalated the 
Authority's proposals originally submitted to arbitration to such 
a degree as to make them new demands. The ALJ consolidated the 
three charges for hearing and decision. 
The ALJ dismissed the Association's charge in U-14781, 
finding that the substance of each of the demands contained in 
the Authority's July 1 proposal was contained in its original 
submission and that the modifications were no more than 
amendments meant to clarify the original proposals. He then 
I727 PERB ^4595 (1994) . 
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determined the negotiability of the Authority's demands (as 
challenged in U-14220) in light of the July 1, 1993 
clarifications. Finding each of the proposals to be mandatory, 
the ALJ dismissed the charge in U-1422 0 in its entirety. In his 
decision in U-14324, he found six of the eight demands submitted 
by the Association to arbitration to be nonmandatory and ordered 
the Association to withdraw them from arbitration. He dismissed 
the Authority's charge as to the remaining two demands. 
The Association excepts to the AKT's decision on numerous 
grounds, which may be categorized as alleged errors by the AKJ in 
finding that the Authority's July 1 proposals were not new 
demands but clarifications of original proposals, in the AKT's 
determining that those proposals were mandatory, and in his 
finding that six of the demands that it had submitted to 
arbitration were nonmandatory. The Authority supports the AKT's 
decision. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of 
the ALJ in part and reverse in part. 
U-14781 
The ALJ decided the allegations in U-14781 first to enable 
him to determine whether the Authority's proposals as originally 
submitted, or as modified by its July 1 amendment, should be 
reviewed to ascertain their negotiability. 
The Association alleges in U-14781 that the following 
demands, as set forth in the July 1 amendment, were either new 
demands or were such an escalation as to be rendered new demands. 
Board - U-14220, U-14324 & -4 
U-14781 
The July 1 demands in issue are as follows: 
OVERTIME 
4) Amend Article VIII, Sections 5 and 7 to 
provide for overtime to be distributed 
equally among BTOs. 
This demand is contained in the original petition for interest 
arbitration and is challenged in U-14220, discussed infra.-7 
HEALTH BENEFITS (ARTICLE XVII) 
The demands below are limited to current employees (i.e., 
single and family coverage). 
6) Institute the following employee 





Institute deductible of $300 (IP/OP - calendar year) 
Institute pre-admission and concurrent hospital review 
program 
8) Major Medical 
Increase deductible to $100 per person, $200 family 
Change benefit level to 75% of reasonable and customary 
No major medical coverage for HIP participants 
-
7The Association argues that overtime equalization was never 
negotiated by the parties and is therefore improperly included in 
both the petition for interest arbitration and, as modified, in 
the July 1 amendment to the petition. The ALJ correctly found, 
however, based upon the testimony at the hearing and a 
stipulation entered into by the parties, that equalization of 
overtime, though not specifically outlined in this demand, was in 
fact negotiated by the parties and, accordingly, that neither the 
demand in the original petition nor the demand in the July 1 
amendment was a new demand. 




These health benefit demands are set forth in the appendix to the 
petition for interest arbitration, with the exception of the 
removal of the reference to coverage of persons already retired 
from the unit. 
VACATIONS, HOLIDAYS, LEAVES 
10) Amend Article XIII, Section l.B to reduce 
vacation for new hires by eight days at each 
level of the vacation entitlement. 
In the original petition, the demand read as follows: 
Reduction of vacation and sick leave 
entitlements for new hires-reduce vacation by 
8 days, reduce sick leave by 6 days. 
The amended demand is a lesser demand than the original to the 
extent that it eliminates the demand for reduction of sick days. 
The additional language concerning reduction in vacation 
entitlements has not been established by the Association to be a 
new or escalated demand. The original demand is susceptible to 
the interpretation that persons hired after a certain date will 
receive less vacation days for the entire term of their 
employment and the amended demand is accordingly construed only 
as a clarification of the original demand. 
11) Replace Article XIII, Section 2.A with the following: 
There shall be 12 paid holidays annually 
which shall be paid in cash in December of 
each year. The paid holidays shall accrue at 
the rate of one per month provided that the 
employee is in a pay status a minimum of 15 
days during the month the holiday is earned. 
Absences due to illness or injury-on-duty 
shall not count toward the 15 day minimum. 
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The original demand was as follows: 
There shall be 12 paid holidays annually 
which shall be paid in cash in June of each 
year, prorated for employees who are on 
active payroll on the respective holidays. 
Contrary to the ALJ, we hold that the modified demand sets 
additional conditions for payment of holiday pay and is, 
therefore, an improper escalation of the original demand. 
14) Replace Article XIII, Section 5.D with the 
following: 
Personal business days will be granted only 
when an extra man is available in the 
schedule or a nonpermanent employee can be 
obtained to cover the tour. The total number 
of personal business days, including EPB, 
shall remain limited to seven (7) per 
employee per year. 
This amended demand adds the word "only" but does not change the 
meaning of the demand in context. It is, therefore, 
substantially the same demand as the one contained in the 
original petition for arbitration. 
The amended demand seeking to replace Article XIII, 
Section 3.B of the contract (which relates to sick leave 
verification) with new language is identical to the original 
demand, with the exception of one sentence: "There will be no 
limitation on the Authority's right to make phone calls to the 
absent employee." That sentence was also included in the 
original petition, although under the heading "Sick Leave 
Proposals". The movement of the sentence to the amended demand 
does not substantially change the nature of the original demand. 
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The ALT determined that the demands set forth in the July 1 
proposal were permissible clarifications or modifications of the 
demands set forth in the Authority's petition for interest 
arbitration. With the exception of the holiday demand, as to 
which we reverse, we agree with the ALJ's holdings. While the 
Association argues that the demands dealing with overtime, health 
benefits, vacations, and sick leave are new proposals, the 
substance of each of these demands is set forth in the 
Authority's petition for interest arbitration. Neither can they 
be characterized, as the Association argues, as an improper 
escalation of demands. We have previously held that a party may 
amend a demand, where the substance of the demand remains 
unchanged, even after an improper practice charge has been 
filed.-7' The Authority's July 1 demands, except as noted above, 
are either the same as or minor modifications of the demands set 
forth in its petition for interest arbitration. We, therefore, 
modify the ALJ's decision in U-14781 with respect to the holiday 
demand, and otherwise affirm the ALJ's dismissal of that charge. 
As to the holiday demand, the Authority is directed to withdraw 
the July 1 amended demand from arbitration.-7 
-
7Amherst Police Club, Inc., 12 PERB f3071 (1979) . 
-
7The original demand was not challenged by the Association and 
accordingly remains properly part of the original petition for 
arbitration. 
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U-14220 
As the Association's challenge in U-14781 to the Authority's 
July 1 proposals was dismissed by the ALT, the Authority's 
demands, as set forth in its original petition and as amended by 
its July 1 modifications, were addressed by the ALJ in Case No. 
U-14220.^7 
The Authority proposals, as modified, follow. 
1. Replace Article XIV, Section 1A with the 
following: 
The Authority will provide each BTO with 104 
RDO's per year.-7 
2. Eliminate Article XIV, Section 2.-7 
-
7The Association did not challenge Authority demands Nos. 4, 10, 
14, 19 and 2 0 as being nonmandatory or impermissibly vague in its 
charge in U-14220. The ALJ, therefore, correctly did not allow 
the challenge to those demands as set forth in U-14781, finding 
that the demands were not new demands, that they had been 
included in the Authority's original petition for interest 
arbitration, and the Association, having failed to raise the 
negotiability of those demands in U-14220, was now time-barred 
from raising the issue in U-14781. See Elmira Police Benevolent 
Ass'n, Inc.. 25 PERB f3072 (1992). 
-
7The present contract clause states: 
A) The [Authority] will provide each BTO with 109 RDOs 
[rotating day off] per year, pursuant to the schedule 
annexed to this Agreement as Exhibit A and agreed upon 
by the parties. New schedules were implemented as of 
December 21, 1981. The parties improved the schedules 
such as Exhibit A by replacing odd tours such as 6 p.m. 
- 2 a.m. and 10 a.m. - 6 p.m. with basic tours such as 
5 p.m. - 1 a.m. and 9 a.m. - 5 p.m. where possible, 
subject to traffic requirements. 
-
7This clause states: 
Starting times shall be in accordance with Exhibit A 
when that schedule is implemented except as otherwise 
agreed upon by the parties. 
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3. The Authority proposes to eliminate Article 
XIII, Section 3(D)(1), amend 3(D), and 
eliminate Article XVII, and Section 10(C), by 
substituting a proposal entitled Injury On 
Duty for BTOBAs for the present existing 
contractual clauses.-7 
INJURY ON DUTY PROPOSAL TO BTO'S 
The TBTA hereby submits to the BTOBA a formal 
written IOD policy. It is intended to spell 
out the managerial oversight that will be 
pursued on IOD claims, incorporate the 
proposals made in collective bargaining and 
amend the differential entitlement which the 
parties have discussed at previous sessions. 
In terms of the oversight provisions, they 
reflect rights which the Authority currently 
has, for the most part but which have not 
been incorporated into the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
Replace Article XIII, Section 3(D)(1) with 
the following language: 
a. An employee incapacitated from performing 
his/her job duties as a result of an 
accidental injury sustained in the course of 
his/her employment will be allowed, for such 
period or periods during such incapacity as 
the Authority may determine in accordance 
with Section 3(D)(2), a differential payment, 
not to exceed 150 days, which shall be 
-
7The present language is as follows: 
Article XIII, Section 3(D)(1), states: 
D) 1. "Injuries on duty" shall mean all accidents 
or injuries sustained on the job under all 
circumstances. The first year to be at full 
pay with no charge to sick leave. The 
employee must notify his supervisor of the 
injury immediately. Such notification shall 
be made at the time the injury occurs or, if 
there is no immediate effects of the injury, 
no later than the commencement of the next 
tour of duty. 
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sufficient to comprise, together with any 
Workers' Compensation payable to him/her 
under the provisions of the Workers' 
Compensation law an amount after taxes equal 
to his/her after tax wages for a forty (40) 
hour work week. 
b. If the absence for which he/she is to be 
allowed pay as herein provided occurs 150 
days or more after the date of the original 
accident, the allowance shall be based upon 
an amount equal to seventy (70) percent of 
the his/her after tax wages for a forty (40) 
hour work week calculated on the date of the 
original accident minus any Workers' 
Compensation payable to him/her under the 
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law. 
c. If the Workers' Compensation payment 
granted pursuant- to law is equal to or 
greater than the amount the employee was 
receiving prior to the period of incapacity, 
after taxes, for a forty (40) hour work week, 
or is equal to or greater than the payment 
provided for absences of 150 days or more, 
the employee shall not receive any 
differential payments or other payments 
provided for herein. 
d. In order to qualify for the differential 
payment described in a and b, the employee 
must be absent from employment because of 
such accidental injuries sustained in the 
course of employment seven consecutive days 
and the payment provided for herein will 
commence after the seventh day of such 
absence. 
No differential pursuant to Sections (D)(1)(a) 
shall be granted; 
a. Unless the employee sustained an 
accidental injury, as defined by the New York 
State Workers' Compensation Law, while 
engaged in the performance of his/her 
assigned duty for the Authority and such 
accidental injury was the direct cause of the 
employee's incapacity for work. 
b. Unless the employee notifies his 
supervisor of the injury immediately. 
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c. If the accident was due to violation by 
the employee of any rule, procedure or policy 
of the Authority. 
d. If the employee was engaged in horse play 
when the accident occurred. 
e. If the employee was under the influence 
of alcohol, drugs or controlled substances at 
the time of the accident. 
f. If the employee failed to report for 
examination or re-examination by a physician 
selected by the Authority when instructed to 
do so under Sections (D)(2) and (3) above. 
g. If the employee failed to report for the 
performance of his/her regular work when 
directed to do so. 
h. If the period for which the differential 
is requested was a period during which the 
employee, in the opinion of a physician 
selected by the Authority, would not have 
been incapacitated for work had it not been 
for some physical or mental condition 
existing prior to the accident. 
i. If the employee failed to comply with 
appropriate medical advice. 
5. The parties7 contract, Article XVII, Section 
10(C) presently states: 
Total disability to be redefined to provide 
that after 24 months of the period of 
disability the employee may engage in other 
employment and continue to receive long term 
disability benefits less earnings from such 
other employment, providing he remains 
disabled from employment as a Bridge and 
Tunnel Officer. 
The Authority seeks to amend Article XVII, Section 10(c) as follows 
C. After 24 months, a physician selected by the 
Authority will re-examine the employee. If the 
physician finds that the employee is capable of 
gainful employment, the employee will be 
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6. The Authority's Health Cost Containment Proposals state: 
Hospitalization 
1. $2 00 Deductible 
2. $300 Deductible 
3. 20% of the first $1,000 for 0/P expenses (Calendar Year) 
4. 20% of 1st $2,500 of hospital charges (IP/OP-Calendar 
Year) 
5. 20% of 1st $5,000 of hospital charges (IP/OP-Calendar 
Year) 
6. 20% of 1st $2,500 with $200 deductible (IP/OP-Calendar 
Year) 
7. 20% of 1st $5,000 with $200 deductible (IP/OP-Calendar 
Year) 
8. 2 0% of 1st $2,500 with $3 00 deductible (IP/OP-Calendar 
Year) 
9. 20% of 1st $5,000 with $300 deductible (IP/OP-Calendar 
Year) 
10.Preadmission and Concurrent Hospital Review Program HIP 
$10 Copayment 
Manor Medical 
1. Deductible increase to $100 GHI/$500 HIP 
2. Deductible increase to $150 GHI/$750 HIP 
3. Deductible increase to $200 GHI/$1,000 HIP 
4. Change Benefit Level from 80% to 75% 
Other Plan Provision 
1. Bi-Weekly Payroll Deductions 
Single $5.56 
Family $16.82 
2. Terminate GHI and Pay Medical/Surgical Expenses as Major 
Medical with: 
(a) $50 GHI/$250 HIP Deductibles 
(b) $100 GHI/$500 HIP Deductibles 
(c) $150 GHI/$750 HIP Deductibles 
(d) $200 GHI/$1,000 HIP Deductibles 
Board - U-14220, U-14324 & -13 
U-14781 
3. Have Travelers pay GHI Benefits. 
The Authority modified this demand in its July 1 proposal to 
clarify that it was only applicable to current employees. The 
demand, as modified, states: 
Health Benefits (Article XVII) 
The Demands below are limited to current employees 
(i.e. single and family coverage). Institute the 





Institute deductible of $300 (IP/OP-calendar year) 
Institute pre-admission and concurrent hospital review 
program. 
Major Medical 
Increase deductibles to $100 per person, $200 family 
Change benefit level to 75% of reasonable and customary 
No major medical coverage for HIP participants 
GHI 
Terminate 
6. Amend Article VIII, Sections 5 and 7 to provide for 
overtime equalization to be distributed equally. 
The ALJ found each of the Authority's proposals challenged 
in U-14220 to be a mandatory subject of negotiation. After a 
careful review of the record, we affirm and adopt the ALJ's 
conclusions of fact and law, for the reasons stated by him, which 
address all of the parties' claims and arguments. 
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The Association also objected to the "arbitrability of any 
matter set forth in the petition which the Authority claims it 
will not make retroactive on the grounds that the matter proposed 
(i.e. retroactivity) has been resolved by agreement during the 
course of negotiations." The Association argues that 
retroactivity has been resolved and, therefore, it was improper 
for the Authority to indicate that there had been no agreement on 
this issue. In support of this argument, it refers to a letter 
from the Authority to the Association, which states in pertinent 
part: 
In light of the fact that the collective 
bargaining agreement between the [Association] and the 
Authority has expired and the current negotiations for 
a successor agreement have not yet been concluded, this 
letter is intended to clarify the parties' current 
positions regarding retroactivity. 
Those terms of a successor agreement, when negotiated, 
which may be made retroactive shall be made effective 
on the first day of the new contract (March 19, 1991) 
unless the parties agree otherwise. It is understood 
that this interim understanding pertains to the current 
negotiations and, in the event such negotiations do not 
result in agreement, shall be of no force or effect. 
The ALJ, finding the language of this letter to be clear and 
unambiguous and finding no testimony or evidence to the contrary, 
held that the issue of retroactivity had not been resolved by the 
parties prior to arbitration and that it was properly presented 
to arbitration by the Authority as an open issue between the 
parties. We affirm his holding in this regard also. 
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U-14324 
In this charge, the Authority alleges that certain demands 
of the Association contained in its response to the petition for 
arbitration are nonmandatory.-' 
The Association's demands follow. 
Demand No. 6. 
Article V, Section 5A, shall be modified to read as 
follows: 
ANNUAL RATE 
YEARS OF SERVICE OF ALLOWANCE 
From the first day of such service 
in the sixth year to the last day 
of service in the tenth year $1,000 Per Year 
From the first day of such service 
in the eleventh year to the last 
day of service in the fifteenth year $2,000 Per Year 
From the first day of such service 
in the sixteenth year to the last 
day of service in the twentieth year $3,000 Per Year 
From the first day of such service 
in the twenty-first year to the last 
day of service $4,000 Per Year 
Article V, Section 5C, shall be modified to read as 
follows: 
C. Beginning with calendar year 1991, an annual lump 
sum longevity allowance will be paid to those members 
of the bargaining unit who became members of a public 
employee pension system of the State or City of New 
York prior to July 1, 1973 and who have continuous 
years of service in the employ of the Authority as 
permanent Bridge and Tunnel Officers in accordance with 
the following schedule: 
^No exceptions were filed by the Authority to the ALJ's decision 
that the Association's Demands Nos. 10 and 22 are mandatory and 
properly included in its response to the Authority's petition for 
interest arbitration. 
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LUMP SUM ANNUAL 
YEAR OF SERVICE LONGEVITY ALLOWANCE 
16th through 20th $3,000 
21st through last day of service $4,000 
The longevity allowance shall be paid on or about 
December 31, 1991 and on each succeeding year prorated 
for those members who first become eligible for an 
increase in the longevityallowance during such year or 
who separate from service prior to December 31 or any 
such year, except that no allowance shall be paid to 
former members of the unit who separate from service 
prior to December 31, 1991. The longevity allowance 
shall be considered as part of the member's regular 
rate of compensation for pension purposes and not for 
overtime pay, shift differential or check-in check-out 
payment. 
Article V, Section 5D shall be deleted. 
We reverse the ALJ's determination that the longevity demand 
is nonmandatory and find it to be a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. The ALJ held the demand to be nonmandatory because 
the longevity payments are made pensionable. Those monies, 
however, may or may not be properly included in an employee's 
compensation for purposes of calculating pension entitlements 
under current law. That is a decision to be made by the 
appropriate retirement system officials which will bind these 
parties, subject to judicial appeal. If the Association's demand 
had stated that the payments are pensionable in accordance with 
law, it clearly would have been a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. That same qualification is necessarily implicit in 
all bargaining demands. We read bargaining demands as having 
been proposed to the extent consistent with law, except in those 
circumstances in which the demand as written is patently 
unlawful. This demand is not clearly unlawful as written and, as 
implicitly qualified, it is mandatorily negotiable. 
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Demand No. 24 
All Bridge and Tunnel Officers shall have all funds 
collected by them fully accounted for at the end of 
each tour. 
The ALJ found this demand to be nonmandatory because he 
considered the accounting for funds collected to be an inherent 
part of the officers' job duties. We find, however, that this 
demand is mandatorily negotiable. The demand seeks a timely 
accounting of funds collected, utilizing either the officers 
themselves or any other means chosen by the Authority. As the 
accounting has implications for employee discipline, a demand for 
timely notification of a discrepancy in those funds, which may be 
used as a basis to discipline an employee, and which does not, on 
balance, unreasonably interfere with any managerial prerogatives 
associated with an accounting of funds, is mandatorily 
negotiable. 
Demand No. 3 5 
Patron complaints shall not be accepted or put into a 
Bridge and Tunnel Officer's file unless made in person 
within 24 hours. If unfounded, it shall be removed 
permanently from the Bridge and Tunnel Officer's file. 
Demand No. 62A 
The [Authority] shall increase the present major 
medical coverage to $1,000,000 per person per illness, 
per year. 
Demand No. 64 
Article VII, Section 1 shall be modified to read: The 
Authority will contribute to the Bridge and Tunnel 
Officers Family Protection Plan a sum annually for each 
employee as follows: 
January 1, 1991 - $1,500.00 
January 1, 1992 - $2,000.00 
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Demand No. 65 
The Authority shall continue to provide coverage for 
both medical and welfare benefits for all widows, 
widowers and children, after a Bridge and Tunnel 
Officer presently covered is deceased. 
The ALT found all of the Association's demands to be 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation and ordered the Association 
to withdraw them from arbitration. After a careful review of the 
record, we affirm the ALJ's conclusions of fact and law, except 
those concerning longevity and accounting of funds. It should be 
noted that the ALJ found Demands Nos. 62A, 64 and 65 to be 
nonmandatory because they applied to retirees as well as current 
employees.—7 After the ALJ issued his decision, we decided 
City of Cohoes,—' which provides further support for his 
findings. 
The ALJ also rejected the Association's waiver argument, 
finding that the fact that the Authority had negotiated with the 
Association about the demands above found to be nonmandatory 
before the petition for interest arbitration was filed did not 
waive its right to file a scope of negotiation charge once the 
petition for arbitration had been filed and the Association 
included those nonmandatory proposals in its response.—7 The 
ALJ also rejected an estoppel theory argued by the Association. 
—
7The Association acknowledged to the ALJ that these demands were 
intended to include retirees. On that basis, the ALJ correctly 
found the demands to be nonmandatory, rejecting as well, the 
waiver and estoppel arguments raised by the Association and 
treated with infra. 
^
727 PERB ?[3058 (September 30, 1994) 
^Johnstown Police Benevolent Ass'n, 25 PERB [^3 085 (1992) ; 
Fairview Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n, Inc., 13 PERB f3102 
(1980). 
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The ALJ found nothing in the record to support a finding that the 
Association concluded to its detriment from the words or actions 
of the Authority that nonmandatory demands would be negotiated, 
without objection, beyond impasse. We also affirm the ALJ's 
findings in this regard.—; 
We, therefore, dismiss the Association's exceptions and 
affirm the ALJ's decisions in Case Nos. U-14220, U-14324 and 
U-14781, except as to the Authority's holiday demand dealt with 
in U-14781 and the longevity and accounting for funds demands in 
U-14324. The charges in Case Nos. U-14220 and U-14781 are 
dismissed, except as noted. With regard to Case No. U-143 24, the 
Association is directed to withdraw from arbitration its demands 
numbered 35, 62A, 64 and 65; the remainder of that charge is 
dismissed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York faS^ 'LLrJJ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
, Member Walt 
Eric J/' Schmertz, Member 
—
;The ALJ also reviewed the correspondence between the parties 
and the record testimony and concluded correctly that the 
Authority's willingness to negotiate benefits for retirees was 
limited to negotiations between the parties prior to a 
declaration of impasse and the filing of the petition for 
arbitration. See Local 650, AFSCME. 18 PERB 53015 (1985) . 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
East Fishkill (Town) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director). The Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) filed a petition seeking to represent the following seven 
currently unrepresented Town employees: comptroller, account 
clerk, secretary to planning and zoning boards, assessor, clerk 
to the highway superintendent, recreation director, and building 
inspector II. The Town argued to the Director that these 
employees are either managerial or confidential within the 
meaning of §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
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(Act) and, therefore, ineligible for representation. After a 
hearing, the Director determined that all of the employees are 
eligible for representation. Pursuant to the parties7 agreement, 
the Director then added the seven employees to an existing unit 
of Town employees which CSEA currently represents. 
The Town appeals from the Director's decision as to all 
positions except the account clerk and the secretary to planning 
and zoning boards. As to the other five positions, the Town 
argues that the Director misapplied the law and failed to 
consider evidence in the record in finding the incumbents 
eligible for representation. CSEA argues in response that the 
Director's decision is correct on the law and the facts in all 
material respects. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's decision. 
Managerial and confidential employees are ineligible for 
representation under §201.7(a) of the Act. Managerial employees 
are only those who formulate policy or who assist or can 
reasonably be required to assist directly in collective 
negotiations, contract administration or personnel functions on 
behalf of their employer. Confidential employees are only those 
who act in a confidential capacity to the second category of 
managerial employee. Unless shown to be excluded from the Act as 
managerial or confidential, public employees, including 
supervisors, are eligible for representation. 
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The Director concluded that the testimony of the several 
employee witnesses and Sam Patton, the Town's supervisor, did not 
establish that any of the employees seeking representation are 
managerial or confidential as defined in the Act. The Director 
concluded that Patton's testimony was largely nonspecific and 
conclusory. Where Patton's testimony varied from the employees' 
description of their duties, the Director gave greater weight to 
the employees' testimony. Having reviewed the record, we concur 
with the Director's assessment regarding Patton's testimony and 
his evaluation of the record evidence. Where the duties as 
rendered by the incumbents of the positions in issue are to any 
degree detailed in the record, they are representative of 
supervisory status. Supervisors at whatever level, however, are 
eligible for representation under current law. Whatever 
operational difficulties this circumstance may present the Town 
can only be addressed by the Legislature. 
Some additional discussion is warranted with respect to 
Robert Mayen, the Town's comptroller. Although we have 
designated other comptrollers as managerial or confidential,^ 
our designations were based upon the duties of those positions as 
shown on the record in those cases. Our designations are not 
based merely on job titles. The record in this case does not 
support Mayen's designation as either managerial or confidential. 
His role in the budget process is largely undefined and it 
^County of Rensselaer (Hudson Valley Community College), 18 PERB 
«|3001 (1985) , aff'q 17 PERB [^4060 (1984) . 
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appears to be, to the extent discretionary, recommendatory in 
nature. There is no showing that in that role Mayen is exposed 
to any confidential labor relations information. Similarly, his 
financial analysis during negotiations or contract administration 
has been restricted thus far to proposals which at the time had 
been made or accepted. 
The Director accurately described the record in all material 
respects and his decision is consistent with §201.7(a) as written 
and applied.-7 Therefore, we affirm the Director's decision for 
the reasons stated herein and in his decision. 
Accordingly, the Town's exceptions are dismissed. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
-See, e.g., Town of Greece, 27 PERB ^3024 (1994); Chautauqua 
County and Chautauqua County Sheriff, 26 PERB J[3070 (1993) . 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 18, 1993, Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed a petition seeking to 
represent a unit of certain employees of the Yonkers City School 
District (employer). Thereafter, the parties executed a consent 
agreement in which they stipulated that the following two 
negotiating units were appropriate: 
UNIT A 
Included; The following titles: Accountant, Assistant 
Supervisor of School Lunch, P.C. Specialist, 
Planner-School Facilities, Programmer, Project 
Coordinator-Construction, Purchasing Agent, 
Supervisor of Accounts Payable, Technical Support 
Manager. 
Excluded: The following titles: Director, Executive 
Director, Program Supervisor, Accounting Analyst, 
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Assistant Director of Personnel, Assistant 
Supervisor of Buildings and Grounds, Assistant 
Supervisor of Maintenance, Assistant Supervisor of 
Custodians, Employee Benefits Manager, Senior 
Budget Analyst, Supervisor of School Facilities, 
Supervisor of School Lunch Programs, 
Transportation Supervisor, Chief Account Auditor, 
Assistant Superintendent of School Administration, 
Assistant Superintendent for Operations, Assistant 
Superintendent Pupil/Assessment, Assistant ..... 
Superintendent Management Services, Assistant 
Superintendent Supervision/Curriculum, Assistant 
Superintendent Restructuring Pre-K to 12, 
Assistant Superintendent of Registration/ 
Compliance, Deputy Superintendent of Schools, 
Executive Assistant, Exempt Secretary to 
Superintendent, Superintendent of Schools, and all 
other titles. 
UNIT B 
Included: The following titles: Medical Inspector, 
Physician, Coordinator. 
Excluded: Coordinator assigned to negotiations and all other 
titles. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held in each unit on November 30, 1994. 
In the election among the 17 employees in Unit A, 6 ballots 
were cast in favor of representation by the petitioner, 10 
ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner, and 
there were no challenged ballots. Inasmuch as the results of the 
election in Unit A indicate that a majority of the employees in 
that unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented by the 
petitioner 
IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed insofar as it seeks representation in Unit A. 
In the election among the 22 employees in Unit B, 12 ballots 
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were cast in favor of representation by the petitioner, 9 ballots 
were cast against representation by the petitioner, and there 
were no challenged ballots. Inasmuch as the results of the 
election in Unit B indicate that a majority of the employees in 
that unit who cast ballots do desire to be represented by the 
petitioner, we have this date certified the petitioner as the 
exclusive bargaining agent for that unit. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
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CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
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Included: The following titles: Medical Inspector, 
Physician, Coordinator. 
Excluded: Coordinator assigned to negotiations and all other 
titles. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local .45.6,.. International _. 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
4&JLtLJL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
A&tfe^z'r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
Eric J./'Schmertz, Member 
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CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Saratoga County Deputy 
Sheriff's PBA has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 200B, Service 
Employees International Union has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All regularly scheduled employees in the 
following civil service titles: Account 
Clerk, Bus Driver, Auto Serviceman, Cleaner, 
Cook, Custodian, Food Service Helper, Part-
Time Teacher Aide, Teacher Aide, School 
Monitor, School Nurse, Typist. 
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Excluded: Cook Manager, Head Auto Mechanic, Head 
Custodian, Board of Education 
Clerk/Superintendent Secretary and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the Local 200B, 
Service Employees International Union. The duty to negotiate 
' collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED:- December 22, 1994 
Albany, New York 
/Av-ivr^^K\^s4 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
